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1. Introduction 
Donor organisations rely on intermediaries to deliver benefits, and they often turn to the same 
intermediaries for help in identifying and selecting suitable beneficiaries. The case of an 
international NGO (unnamed for confidentiality) that donates money to buy goats for poor 
families in Honduras is typical. This donor engaged local leaders to act as intermediaries. 
Their main task was to organise the purchase and delivery of goats, but the donor also 
entrusted these leaders with the task of selecting target beneficiaries, because the leaders had 
more information than the donor for identifying the poorest families in their villages. In this 
paper, we analyse the effect of allocating the two tasks to the same agent.  
Targeting is a central issue in development projects. Resource limitations pressure donors (be 
they governmental or non-governmental organisations) to identify and direct benefits to those 
most in need; the benefits might be schoolbooks, vouchers, food and shelter for disaster relief, 
healthcare and medicines, seeds and training as agricultural support, or even money. The 
literature on targeting highlights the dilemma of whether to involve local leaders whose 
informational advantage may be offset by conflicting interests.1 Experts also emphasise the 
risk that local leaders derive power from their role in selection.  
In this paper, we motivate and investigate two specific concerns: (1) selection powers may 
make an intermediary less reliable in project delivery; (2) delivery powers may create a 
conflict of interest in the selection task. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to set 
up an experimental model of the donor’s selection-and-delivery problem. So our goal is 
exploratory. If combining the selection and delivery tasks increases the level of total 
distortions in a laboratory setting, then it makes sense to bear the costs of analysing whether 
combining selection and delivery tasks has a similar effect in the field. By adopting a simple 
game-theoretic representation of this donor problem, we also hope to clarify exactly how 
combining selection and delivery tasks under a common agent can exacerbate the agency 
problems in each task. 
While some intermediaries are altruistic individuals who share the donor’s aims, others may 
be tempted to divert resources to their personal benefit. This leads to two types of distortion: 
intermediaries may select the “wrong” (non-needy) beneficiaries and they may divert the 
donor’s resources to themselves instead of the selected beneficiaries. The donor’s problem is 
to limit these distortions in selection and delivery. The goat-donor NGO in the above example 
suffered from significant distortion of both types. A follow-up study of this project (see 
Ketzis (1997)) revealed that some local leaders had selected beneficiaries who were among 
the richest in their village, and many leaders had diverted benefits to their relatives (a form of 
embezzlement).  
                                                 
1 See Jaspars and Young (1995: 92-93) for evidence from a typical best practice guide, and Galasso and 
Ravallion (2005) for an economic model where donor and intermediary have different distributive goals. 
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Because it is very costly for the donor to investigate whether the intermediary is 
misappropriating funds (embezzling), donors only mount investigations after receiving strong 
signals of foul play. The selected recipients are natural monitors of the intermediary, because 
each recipient automatically observes what the intermediary delivers to her. In fact, it is now 
common practice for NGOs to inform selected beneficiaries of what they can expect to 
receive and to ask them to complain if the intermediary does not deliver as much as promised.  
Unfortunately, beneficiaries do not always complain about foul play. Three key factors 
frequently explain this reticence: costs of complaining, distinct norms of justice and 
reciprocity (e.g. from feelings of gratitude). The costs of complaining may be material (e.g. 
the intermediary may retaliate) or psychological (e.g. a feeling of disloyalty to the 
intermediary). Distinct norms are common – the villagers may consider it reasonable for the 
intermediary to appropriate funds that the donor intended for the villagers.2 Gratitude – the 
desire to reciprocate kind behaviour – also inhibits complaints; villagers may feel thankful to 
the intermediary for benefits even if less than the donor intended. 
In this paper, we focus on reciprocity motives (like gratitude) as a cause of reticence. 
Consider the incentives of a local intermediary, such as a village leader in the above goat-
introduction project. When he selects among potential beneficiaries, he knows that the donor 
wants him to pick poorer families, but richer families, being illegitimate recipients, may feel 
more grateful to him. If purely self-interested, he would pick rich beneficiaries, since their 
gratitude makes them less likely to complain. This way, he can divert more funds to himself. 
So not only do the benefits go to the wrong people, but the beneficiaries also receive less.  
How can these negative consequences be alleviated? One alternative is to separate the tasks of 
selection and delivery. Indeed, NGOs often send their own representative to select 
beneficiaries, delegating only the delivery task to a local intermediary. This has been 
criticised on the grounds that representatives cannot become as informed as the local 
intermediary, so they are bound to pick some richer households as beneficiaries by mistake. In 
the worst case, separate selection (by representatives) is equivalent to random selection, but 
the opportunistic local intermediaries just described would pick richer families on purpose. So 
for high levels of opportunism, even if separate selection were fully random, it could be less 
distorted than selection by the informed intermediary.  
The selection method can also affect the gratitude of a given beneficiary. Under selection by 
intermediaries, beneficiaries may feel grateful to the intermediary simply for selecting them. 
By contrast, under separated (or random) selection, any gratitude is directed at the 
representative (so it does not interfere with the beneficiary’s willingness to complain). So we 
conjecture that beneficiaries complain more often when selection is separated. Provided 
intermediaries anticipate this effect, they will divert less. 
                                                 
2 Indeed, in Platteau and Gaspart’s (2003) case study, villagers were so angry when the donor sanctioning the 
leader for embezzling project funds that they punished the few villagers who had complained to the donor. 
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In the light of these two possible benefits, we conjecture that even when separated selection is 
equivalent to random selection, this selection method is often superior to selection by the 
intermediary. In this paper, we put this conjecture to a test. We design a laboratory 
experiment that captures the essential features of the donor problem in a stylised game. The 
experimental approach allows us to compare the two institutions (random versus intermediary 
selection) in a controlled environment. Our model involves one intermediary and four 
villagers, two of them “rich” and two of them “poor”. The intermediary allocates a sum of 
money (the donated funds) to two of the villagers (the target beneficiaries), and keeps the 
remainder for himself. There are two treatments: in the Intermediary Selection (IS) treatment, 
the intermediary also selects the target beneficiaries; in the Random Selection (RS) treatment, 
this selection is random. A villager who is allocated too little by the intermediary can file a 
costly complaint. This triggers an investigation, and the embezzling intermediary is penalised. 
With this experimental set-up, we can compare the performance of the two institutional 
designs in terms of selection distortion and levels of embezzlement. Further, we can identify 
the behavioural effects on which we based our conjectures. 
In our results, rich villagers do indeed complain less than poor villagers. The selection method 
also matters: rich villagers tend to complain more under random selection than under 
intermediary selection. Our results about intermediary behaviour are partly in line with our 
conjectures. A substantial number of intermediaries choose to give to rich villagers, despite a 
strong countervailing pressure from fairness motivations favouring the poor. The selection 
distortion in our data is roughly the same as under random selection. Our results on 
embezzlement under the two selection institutions strongly corroborate our predictions. 
Embezzlement is clearly lower under random selection: intermediaries allocate almost 60% 
more to the villagers when they do not have the power to select. Overall, in our experiment, 
poor villagers are better off under random selection, so separating the selection from the 
delivery task helps the donor achieve its objectives.  
These results are relevant for a broader range of issues. Our framework also applies when 
states (and supra-national bodies such as the European Union) set up “Social Funds” to 
finance projects designed and proposed by NGOs. Here, project design determines the 
potential beneficiaries (e.g. a new school most benefits families living close to the proposed 
site). So, an NGO that wins resources from a Social Fund acts as intermediary in the effective 
selection of target beneficiaries as well as in the delivery of benefits (project implementation). 
Distorted selection is a major topic in the analysis of bureaucracy and decentralisation. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show that corruption is particularly damaging when it distorts the 
allocation of economic resources. In Banerjee (1997), governmental red tape serves to prevent 
bureaucrats from selecting the rich in place of the needy. Our results suggest that it may 
instead be optimal to entirely remove selection power from bureaucrats who can embezzle 
resources. Our analysis directly applies to the question of decentralising selection tasks to the 
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local intermediaries who manage the delivery task. Bardhan (2002) summarises existing 
empirical and theoretical work on how decentralisation affects distortions in selection.3  
Our analysis is closely related to the topic of empowerment. Development practitioners and 
theorists have long argued that villagers only stand up for their rights when they feel entitled 
to benefits, (see Chambers (1983), Chabal and Daloz (1999), Platteau and Abraham (2002), 
World Bank (2002), and Reinikka and Svensson (2005)).4 If villagers feel less entitled to 
make demands on the intermediary when the intermediary selects recipients, removing this 
selection power may help to empower villagers.  
Grass-roots participation is central to the community-based approach that has recently gained 
currency in the world of development (e.g. see Chambers (1983) and World Bank (1996)). In 
its ideal form, every villager is an “intermediary” as well as recipient, but in practice such 
projects often suffer from “capture” by an elite.5 Capture makes our analysis relevant, 
because the elite effectively becomes the intermediary.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. In section 3 we 
describe the experimental model and procedures. Section 4 outlines our hypotheses. The 
results of the experiment are presented in section 5. Section 6 summarises and concludes.  
2. Related experimental literature 
There is no experimental study of our donor problem in a development context, but our set-up 
relates to a range of prior experiments. Since our game involves costly punishment, the large 
literature on the ultimatum game is relevant to our study. In this game, introduced by Güth, 
Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982), the proposer suggests a division of a cake to the 
responder. If the responder accepts, the division is implemented; if he rejects, neither receives 
anything. Subgame perfect equilibrium predicts that the responder accepts any positive offer. 
Foreseeing this, the proposer offers virtually nothing, and the responder accepts. The 
experimental evidence strongly refutes this prediction. Responders reject substantial amounts 
of money, while proposers make positive offers (often half of the cake). The rich evidence 
from the ultimatum game − see Camerer (2003) for a recent survey − leads us to expect that in 
our game villagers will generally be willing to engage in costly complaints.6  
                                                 
3 See also Wade (1982), Fuentes (1996), Tendler (1997) and Bardhan and Mookerjee (2005). 
4 Prendergast (2002 and 2003) shows how difficult it is to use complaints from recipients in bureaucratic and 
consumer settings. However, in his theory, “monitoring from below” leads the “intermediaries” to over-allocate 
resources, because the resources are public and he implicitly rules out embezzlement. 
5 See Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000), Bierschenk, de Sardan and Chauveau (2000), Conning and Kevane 
(2002), Platteau and Gaspart (2003) and Reinikka and Svensson (2004). 
6 More recently, costly punishment has become a popular research issue in the context of public good games. In 
standard public good games, each subject in a group of n persons can decide to invest an amount x (up to some 
limit) in a public good. Everybody in the group of n individuals receives a return of cx, where c < 1, but nc > 1. 
It is then a dominant strategy for rational players to not invest, but the Pareto efficient solution requires 
everybody to cooperate by investing the maximum. Experimental evidence (see, e.g. Keser and van Winden 
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Extensions of the ultimatum game beyond the one-to-one encounter, as is vital for any model 
of the donor problem, are surprisingly rare. Okada and Riedl (1999) give the proposer the 
choice to divide either a small cake between himself and one responder, or a larger cake 
between himself and two responders (both having veto power). Despite being Pareto-
dominated and unequal (in that one person never receives anything), many proposers choose 
the small pie, single responder option. Güth and van Damme (1998) add a dummy player 
(who can receive but has no veto power) to the standard ultimatum game under various 
informational conditions. The dummy typically gets nothing. Like ours, these papers look at 
costly punishment in a multi-player game, but neither investigates the impact of how 
responders are selected. 
Brandts, Güth, and Stiehler (2006) do look at player selection effects. In their game, the first 
mover, given information from personality questionnaires, chooses to which of two players to 
delegate the power to divide a cake. The authors find that allocators selected in this way 
allocate more to the first movers than those in a random selection control. This hints at some 
form of gratitude (also a focus of our work), but since their game does not allow for 
punishment, the environment they study is fundamentally different from the donor problem.  
Most akin to our study is the recent work by Barr, Lindelöw, and Serneels (2003).7 These 
authors also address the problem of embezzlement in service delivery in developing countries. 
They focus on the effect of wages, effort observability, professional norms and the rules for 
assigning a monitor. In their game, the intermediary decides how much to embezzle and the 
monitor chooses how much to spend on monitoring the intermediary. The experimental 
subjects are Ethiopian nursing students. The authors find that intermediaries embezzle less 
when their wages increase, when the risk of being caught rises, and when they face an elected 
rather than a randomly selected monitor. In contrast with our setting, the recipients 
themselves neither monitor nor complain (recipients do not observe any signals of 
embezzlement). Furthermore, the intermediary does not select the recipients, so the problem 
of distorted selection does not arise.  
These papers shed some light on our topic, but they look at very different set-ups. So their 
results cannot answer our research questions. A new experiment needs to be designed. 
3. The model and the experimental design 
3.1. The model 
We designed a maximally simplified experimental model that still captures essential features 
of the real-life donor problem and allows us to test the above conjectures. Given our focus on 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2000)) finds positive, but declining contributions. Fehr and Gächter (2000) introduce a costly punishment 
opportunity. This raises contributions and the decline disappears. 
7 See also the small, but growing literature on corruption experiments, e.g. Frank and Schulze (2000), Abbink, 
Irlenbusch, and Renner (2002), and González, Güth, and Levati (2002). 
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the interaction between the intermediary and the villagers, we decided not to include the 
donor as an active player. This allowed us to design a two stage game with the intermediary 
as the first mover and four villagers as second movers.  
The first mover’s delivery task is to allocate an amount of 100 talers (the fictitious 
experimental currency) to two of the four second movers. This amount represents the 
donation from the simulated donor. The first mover can allocate less than 100 talers to the 
second movers, because he can keep any remainder for himself – this self-allocation 
represents embezzlement.  
The four second movers, labelled S1, S2, S3, and S4, play the role of the villagers receiving 
the donation.8 At the outset of the experiment, each player has an endowment. The second 
movers S1 and S2 have an endowment of 0, while S3 and S4 are initially given an amount of 
50. So we refer to S1 and S2 as the “poor” (needy) villagers, and to S3 and S4 as the “rich” 
(less needy) second movers. The first mover also starts with an endowment. He is initially 
endowed with 100 talers, making him the richest of all players. This reflects the fact that in 
real-life situations the intermediary is typically a powerful and relatively wealthy person in 
the village. (Note that these 100 talers include any salary from the donor.) All players know 
the distribution of endowments and the first mover knows the endowments of the second 
movers. 
The first mover makes one or two decisions, depending on the treatment. In the IS 
(intermediary selection) treatment, he selects exactly two of the second movers as being 
“active”. In the RS (random selection) treatment, this decision is omitted and the active 
second movers are selected at random (with equal probability); this captures the extreme case 
of selection by an uninformed representative of the donor). In both treatments the first mover 
divides an amount of 100 (which he receives in addition to his endowment) between the two 
active second movers and himself; he can allocate up to 50 talers to each second mover. 
At the second stage of the game, each of the active second movers decides whether or not to 
file a complaint against the first mover. An active second mover can file a complaint if she 
has received less than 50 talers. If an active second mover has received the full 50 talers, then 
she cannot complain. This reflects the donor’s intention that the intermediary should allocate 
the full 50 talers to each of the active second movers.9
A complaint inflicts a cost of 10 talers on the second mover who files it. This arrangement 
captures a situation in which negative consequences outweigh possible gains from 
complaining. These negative consequences could be hassle costs from filing a complaint, or a 
                                                 
8 The choice of two villagers of each type results from a trade-off between realism and practicality. The smallest 
number of second movers with which we could model the situation would be two, one of each type. We chose a 
larger number to be closer to the village scenario; exceeding four would have implied an excessive resource cost. 
9 To avoid suggestive wording in the instructions, we did not explicitly label self-allocation as embezzlement. 
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negative reputation within the village as an informer. Gains may include some compensation 
of the complaining villager by the donor, but these are typically smaller.10
In the case of a valid complaint, an investigation is carried out and the first mover is caught 
(with certainty, for simplicity). As a penalty, the first mover’s final payoff is reduced to 50 
talers, independent of how much he has embezzled (i.e., he loses 50 talers plus all the talers 
he allocated to himself). This punishment can be interpreted as a fine or a reputational cost. 
Second movers cannot complain about not being selected. This reflects the assumption that 
the donor cannot identify who is needy and who is not, even with a costly investigation. In 
fact, inactive second movers can never file a complaint, not even on behalf of the active 
second movers. This makes sense, because second movers only observe their own allocations, 
so inactive second movers cannot detect embezzlement.11
In the experiment, subjects play the game only once. This captures a scenario in which the 
donor makes a single donation to a given village (e.g. giving out food as disaster relief or text 
books for schooling), or implements a project that is a one-off in nature (e.g. building a 
school).12 The choice of the one-shot environment ensures that repeated-game effects do not 
interfere with the gratitude effects we seek to isolate in this paper.  
3.2. The conduct of the experiment 
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Decision Research and Experimental 
Economics (CeDEx) of the University of Nottingham. Subjects were recruited by e-mail from 
a database of students, who had previously registered at CeDEx as potential participants in 
experiments. Each subject was allowed to participate in only one session, and no subject had 
participated in experiments similar to the present one. The subjects were undergraduate 
students from a wide range of disciplines. Virtually all subjects were aged between 19 and 25, 
with a balanced gender distribution.13
                                                 
10 It is difficult to solve the donor problem by making (valid) complaints profitable. First, the intermediary can 
increase threats in response to higher rewards. Second, high rewards may induce invalid complaints. We 
represented the complaint costs by a lump-sum (10 talers) to simplify the rules of the game. 
11 Empirically, individuals tend only to be asked to report on personal receipts (see e.g. Olken’s (2006) analysis 
of rice redistribution). Another reason is that emotions, like jealousy, can distort reporting on others’ receipts. 
12 Platteau and Gaspart (2003) note that, aiming for sustainability, some donors intentionally avoid repeat 
funding of projects to force financial independence of the village after the initial donation of seed money. 
13 We ran a standard lab experiment with students, rather than villagers in a developing country, because this 
well-established technique allows optimal control of the experimental environment. This is particularly 
important, as the game has not been run before. Our results might be affected by this choice of subject pool. 
Note, however, that we focus on the comparison of treatments, so our conclusions are not sensitive to the 
possibility of magnitude effects (Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991), Brandts, Saijo, and 
Schram (2004)). Related experiments conducted in developing countries are reported e.g. in Henrich, Boyd, 
Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and McElreath (2001), Barr and Kinsey (2002), and Humphrey and Verschoor 
(2004); Oosterbeek, Sloof and van de Kuilen’s (2004) meta-analysis find that ultimatum game tendencies vary 
geographically, but mostly rule out cultural trait explanations. 
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First movers and second movers were told to go to separate lecture theatres by email. This 
measure increases anonymity since first and second movers did not see each other.14 
Participants were not allowed to communicate and we ensured that the distance between 
subjects was sufficient to prevent them from influencing each other’s decisions - the lecture 
theatre for the second movers had a capacity of 120 seats, so there was much empty space 
between participants (laboratory-style visual separation of participants was not possible). 
Each play consists of the first mover’s selection and allocation decision and the active second 
movers’ complaint decision. To gather a rich data set, we decided to elicit complete strategies 
from the second movers rather than decisions on a particular node of the game.15 Second 
movers therefore had to decide, before learning the first mover’s decision, on a minimum 
acceptance level. This was the threshold below which they would file a complaint if they were 
selected as active second movers.16 If we had used the traditional approach to let participants 
play the game move by move, data on complaints would only be available for the specific 
allocations actually observed in the experiment. Treatment differences might then have been 
impossible to detect. 
Each second mover had to make this decision for both treatments of the experiment, i.e. 
specify one number for the case in which the intermediary selects her as active, and one 
number for the case in which she is selected randomly. This “second-level” strategy 
elicitation gives us a direct comparison between the two treatments in terms of complaint 
behaviour.17 It also doubles the number of independent observations we obtain from the same 
number of participants.  
Sessions started at the same time for first and second movers. Two research assistants (one in 
each room) read aloud the instructions, which were the same for first and second movers, and 
for both treatments of the game. The instructions were context-free, making no reference to 
                                                 
14 We aimed to have four groups of five players for each session (i.e. four first movers in one room and 16 
second movers in the other room). Due to variation in the show-up rates, the actual number of groups ranged 
from two to five. 
15 This is a simplified version of the strategy method proposed by Selten (1967). It is sometimes argued that the 
elicitation of complete strategies triggers “cold” decisions that may be different from the “hot” decisions made 
when reacting to an act actually carried out by a previous mover. If this were the case, we would expect less 
emotional reactions, reducing our ability to identify the treatment effects. Against this potential downside of the 
strategy approach, we have a clear upside: the data become so much richer that even very subtle effects can be 
detected. Evidence for substantially different behaviour triggered by the two methods is sparse. Brandts and 
Charness (2000) examine behaviour in different interactive games comparing spontaneous play and complete 
strategy elicitation, but find results to be unaffected. They suggest that both procedures are equivalent for low-
complexity tasks. Abbink and Pezzini (2005) also use both methods; they do not find any effect reversed, but 
identify significant effects in the strategy data that are not detectable with spontaneous play. 
16 Implicitly we restrict the second movers to monotone strategies. It seems implausible that many second 
movers would have strategies that prescribe a complaint for one offer and no complaint for a lower one. 
17 We also conducted pilot sessions using only one variant. Though data are too sparse to apply a meaningful 
statistical analysis, the results look encouragingly similar. 
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the development scenario we model.18 The written instructions are reproduced in appendix B. 
After reading out the instructions, the assistants handed out the decision sheets. The first 
movers’ decision sheets told them which treatment they were playing. In the RS treatment, the 
active second movers were preselected by a random process that made selection of each 
combination of two second movers equally likely. In the IS treatment, first movers had to tick 
boxes indicating the two second movers they wished to select.  
When all participants had made their decisions, their decision sheets were collected, and the 
experimenter calculated and filled in a results sheet for each participant. While waiting for the 
results, the subjects filled in questionnaires asking about their reasoning. The questions are 
reproduced in appendix C. 
Each session lasted approximately 45 minutes; this includes the time spent to read the 
instructions. At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their total earnings 
anonymously in cash, at a conversion rate of one pound sterling for 10 talers. To guarantee a 
minimum payment of £3 (as promised in the invitation emails) we granted a show-up fee of 
£4. In the worst case, a poor second mover who was allocated nothing and complained would 
make a loss of £1 from play, achieving a take-home payoff of £3. Subjects earned between 
£3.50 and £20.50 with an average payoff of £9.15 and a mode of £9, which are considerably 
above the typical student wage in Nottingham. At the time of the experiment, the exchange 
rate to other major currencies was approximately US-$1.80 and €1.50 for £1.00. 
We conducted four sessions with each treatment. This allowed us to gather data from 15 first 
movers in each treatment (IS and RS) and 60 second movers in each role (rich or poor). 
Notice that second movers play both treatments at the same time. Since the game is one-shot 
and simultaneously played, we can treat each individual as an independent observation. Our 
controlled environment allows us to base our statistical analysis entirely on nonparametric 
tests performed on these data points. 
4. Hypotheses 
An obvious benchmark hypothesis can be derived from a game theoretic analysis of our 
model. If all the actors are fully rational own-payoff maximisers, the second movers never 
complain, as it is costly. Anticipating that nobody will complain, the first mover always 
embezzles the whole pie, and in the treatment where the intermediary selects (IS), is 
indifferent between selecting rich and poor beneficiaries. So all second movers end up with 
only their endowment, and the selection institution has no impact. 
                                                 
18 Evidence for the effects of instruction framing has been mixed so far. In a tax evasion experiment, Baldry 
(1986) finds far more evasion if the task is presented neutrally as a gambling opportunity, but Alm, McClelland, 
and Schulze (1992) find no differences. Burnham, McCabe, and Smith (2000) find significantly less trusting 
choices in a reciprocity game when players are called “opponents” instead of “partners”. On the other hand, 
Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002) do not find significantly different behaviour between a neutrally and a 
naturally worded version of the bribery experiment by Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2002). 
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Hypothesis H0. Second movers never complain. First movers are indifferent between 
selecting rich and poor second movers in IS and they keep the whole pie in both treatments. 
A large body of previous experimental evidence, e.g. from the ultimatum game, suggests that 
this outcome is unlikely. Norms of fairness tend to motivate significant complaining. On the 
other hand, feelings of gratitude may inhibit complaints. We focus on the interaction between 
these two effects. There are two reasons to expect more complaints from poor than rich 
second movers. In both treatments, the poor are likely to be more demanding, because (having 
no endowment) they feel needier. Further, in the IS treatment, the poor second movers may 
feel grateful when selected by the intermediary, but rich second movers, being less entitled to 
selection, have more reason to feel grateful. All standard norms of fairness dictate that the 
first mover should select the poor, not the rich, second movers.19
Hypothesis H1. Rich second movers complain less than poor ones, i.e. their complaint 
thresholds are lower. This difference is greater in the IS treatment. 
Notice that gratitude for selection (and related reciprocity motives) can only inhibit 
complaints when directed at the intermediary, as in the IS treatment; in the random selection 
(RS) treatment, there is no such effect. So we predict that second movers (especially the rich) 
will complain less in IS than in RS. (This prediction contrasts with that of consequentialist 
models of fairness (such as Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) inequality aversion model) where 
second mover strategies would be independent of the selection treatment, since selected 
second mover payoff choices are the same in either treatment.) 
Hypothesis H2. Second movers complain less in IS than in RS, i.e. their complaint thresholds 
are lower.  
Gratitude and reciprocity might just shift in the opposite direction, because second movers 
might feel that the first mover is less responsible for final outcomes when selection is random 
– the first mover has less overall control in RS. This “responsibility-alleviation”20 effect 
applies more strongly to poor than rich second movers, because the rich expect little from the 
intermediary even where perceived as fully responsible. It implies: 
Hypothesis H2'. Second movers complain more in IS than in RS, i.e. their complaint 
thresholds are higher.  
Turning our attention to the intermediaries, we can formulate two countervailing hypotheses. 
If an opportunistic first mover thinks that the rich complain less than the poor (as in 
hypothesis H1), then he selects the rich so that he can get away with more embezzlement.  
                                                 
19 Defining kindness of an action as giving more than demanded by societal norms and applying, for instance, 
the formal reciprocity model of Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2008) immediately generates these predictions. 
20 Charness (2000) introduced this term to denote how “a shift of responsibility to an external authority dampens 
internal impulses towards honesty, loyalty, or generosity.” In our case, a shift in responsibility for selection 
(away from the intermediary) dampens the second movers’ tendency to hold the intermediary responsible for 
delivery (which the intermediary always controls). 
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Hypothesis H3. First movers select the rich second movers.  
The counter-hypothesis is that first movers are predominantly motivated by fairness 
considerations and wish to give to the poor because they are more needy.21
Hypothesis H3'. First movers select the poor second movers. 
We are also interested in how much the intermediaries deliver. If an opportunistic first mover 
thinks that second movers complain less in IS than in RS (as in hypothesis H2), then he will 
embezzle more in IS. 
Hypothesis H4. First movers allocate less to second movers in IS than in RS. 
Note that there is another reason why first movers might allocate more on average in RS than 
IS. In IS, an opportunistic first mover can always pick the rich, whereas in RS he is 
sometimes forced to allocate to a poor second mover. If he thinks the poor complain more (as 
in H1), he therefore allocates more on average in RS (even if he does not believe H2). 
5. Results 
We summarise the relevant data in this section, but the reader can also find the raw data in 
appendix A: Tables A1 and A2 show the participants’ decisions in the two treatments of our 
experiment. Each row stands for one matching. The first column depicts the session number. 
The second column indicates the number of the (up to five) first movers of the session. 
Columns 3 and 5 depict the active second movers – selected by the first mover in IS, and 
randomly drawn in RS. Columns 4 and 6 show how much the first mover allocated to these 
second movers. The remaining columns depict the decisions made by the four second movers 
of the game, i.e. the thresholds chosen for the treatments with intermediary selection (IS) and 
random selection (RS). 
It is immediately clear that first movers give allocations substantially above zero, the amount 
predicted by the selfish subgame perfect equilibrium (hypothesis H0). In fact, a zero 
allocation does not occur once in our data. Second movers’ thresholds are also typically 
positive, though we do observe a threshold of zero in 62 out of 240 cases (25.8%). Overall, 
we can conclude, as expected, that the data refute hypothesis H0. 
Observation 0. First movers’ allocations are strictly positive in all cases and second movers’ 
complaint thresholds are strictly positive in a majority of cases. So H0 is not supported.  
                                                 
21 The experimental literature contains abundant evidence on fairness considerations, albeit mostly from two-
player settings. In dictator games, for instance, one player (the sender) is asked to divide a cake between himself 
and another person. Though the receiver has no way of responding, senders tend to allocate substantial amounts 
to them, often up to an equal split of the pie (see Camerer (2003) for an overview). The equal split is also a very 
prominent outcome in many other experimental games, like the ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, and 
Schwarze (1982), or the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Scholars have recently begun to 
develop behavioural models that formalise inequality aversion, see e.g. Bolton (1991), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), and Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007). 
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5.1. Gratitude of rich versus poor second movers 
Our hypothesis H1 states that the rich second movers are less likely to complain. So we 
should observe lower (i.e. more lenient) thresholds for complaints among the rich second 
movers (S3 and S4) than among the poor ones (S1 and S2). The average thresholds, computed  
from the entries in tables A1 and A2, are listed in table 1. (For second movers, we can pool 
the data from both tables because they did not know which treatment would be played.) 
Table 1. Average complaint thresholds 
 IS RS Overall
Poor (S1, S2) 26.6 26.8 26.7 
Rich (S3, S4) 17.8 22.2 20.0 
Overall 22.2 24.5 23.4 
 
Fisher’s two-sample permutation test22 rejects the null hypothesis of equal thresholds (for rich 
and poor) at a significance level of α = 0.05 (one-sided). This holds for both treatments. 
The average figures suggest that the difference is greater in the IS treatment, as hypothesis H1 
predicts. The difference between the thresholds of the rich and the poor is almost twice as 
large. To assess statistical significance, we need a different test method, because all subjects 
played both treatments and observations from IS and RS are therefore not independent. To 
solve this problem, we look at those subjects whose thresholds differ by treatment. Table 2 
shows, for each of the two roles (poor and rich), how many subjects submitted (a) higher, (b) 
lower, (c) equal thresholds in RS compared to IS.  
Table 2. Within subject comparisons of thresholds across treatments 
 Number of subjects whose threshold is: 
 Higher in RS Lower in RS Equal in RS and IS 
Poor (S1, S2) 13 20 27 
Rich (S3, S4) 18 8 34 
In table 2 we can see a tendency towards higher thresholds in RS among rich second movers, 
and a contrasting tendency towards lower thresholds in RS among poor second movers. We 
apply Fisher’s exact test to the first two columns of table 2 to check whether this sharp 
contrast (20 vs 13 as compared with 8 vs 18) is statistically significant. The test rejects the 
null hypothesis at the one-sided 5% level. This confirms that the effect of lower thresholds 
                                                 
22 This test is a non-parametric alternative to the t-test. For a discussion of the power of this test see Moir (1998). 
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among rich second movers is indeed more pronounced in IS. Taking this result together with 
the generally lower thresholds for the rich, we find strong support for H1.23
Observation 1. Rich second movers are less likely to complain than poor second movers, and 
this effect is greater in RS. This supports H1. 
5.2. The effect of selection on gratitude 
For the treatment comparison of second mover complaint behaviour we had formulated two 
competing hypotheses. Hypothesis H2 led us to expect higher thresholds under random 
selection, as second movers then feel less grateful to the first mover. Hypothesis H2' led us to 
expect the opposite, namely lower thresholds under random selection, as second movers then 
perceive first movers as less responsible. 
The previous analysis of the data from table 2 allows us to test these hypotheses as well. 
Recall that we observe 18 rich second movers who choose a higher threshold under RS than 
under IS, while only eight of them exhibit lower thresholds under RS. According to the 
binomial test this difference is significant at α = 0.05 (one-sided). Thus we find some 
evidence in favour of H2 in our data. 
Observation 2a. Rich second movers tend to have higher complaint thresholds under RS than 
under IS. Hypothesis H2 is supported for rich second movers.  
The questionnaire responses point to increased gratitude among the rich in IS, as the main 
cause of this difference. For instance, one subject chose a zero threshold (in her words) “as I 
wanted to ‘thank’ the first mover for choosing me by not fining them.” Some poor also 
reported increased gratitude in IS (e.g. “if I have been chosen…I wouldn’t want to be nasty”), 
but there is no systematic support for H2 in the decisions of the poor. The tendency we found 
towards higher thresholds in IS (20 subjects versus 13 in the opposite direction) is not 
significant. Nevertheless, it does suggest that for poor second movers, the countervailing 
force behind H2' is at least as strong as the force motivating H2. 
Observation 2b. For poor second movers, a significant difference between complaint 
thresholds in the two treatments cannot be detected.  
Note that we expected hypothesis H2 to be stronger for the rich second movers and H2' 
stronger for the poor ones. The questionnaires provide some anecdotal evidence for the 
responsibility alleviation effect that motivated H2'. One poor second mover explained that she 
had chosen a lower threshold in RS than IS because in the “random [case] the first mover has 
less responsibility to be fair”. Another felt a need to give the first mover “more leeway” in 
RS. Two others implicitly took the related view that things are more personal in IS than RS – 
                                                 
23 Further support can be found in the post-experimental questionnaire. For instance, one rich second mover 
explicitly wrote: “…as I have some endowment I didn’t see any point in being greedy.” 
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one mentioned a “vengeance” motive in IS (and not in RS), while the other felt the first mover 
should give more in IS, because he had “specifically chosen me”.24
5.3. The distorted selection effect 
We now turn our analysis to the behaviour of first movers. According to hypothesis H3, 
intermediaries will frequently select the rich second movers, expecting them to complain less. 
The counter-hypothesis H3' predicts the opposite: Fairness considerations lead first movers to 
select the poor. In our data, we find approximately equal support for both hypotheses. Five of 
the fifteen first movers select both rich second movers, while six of them choose the two poor 
ones. Four intermediaries choose one of each kind (the questionnaires suggest that this mixing 
choice stems from indifference, e.g. stating it was a “random choice”). 
The questionnaire reveals that most instances of distorted selection are indeed, as argued in 
our motivation for H3, due to the expectation that rich second movers would be less likely to 
complain. For instance, one first mover said that he chose the rich “because they already had 
an allocation of money and so seemed less likely to complain”. The questionnaires also 
supported the view behind H3' that inequality aversion is a strong behavioural force: First 
movers who chose the poor were indeed motivated mainly by fairness considerations (one 
wrote, “I chose S1 and S2 because they didn’t have an endowment so I felt sorry for them” 
and another one explained the same choice as a way “to let them at least have something”).25  
Observation 3. Rich second movers are about as likely to be selected in IS as poor second 
movers. So we find as much support for H3 as for H3'. 
It is interesting to compare selection distortion under intermediary selection with the 
benchmark of random selection. Under random selection, a rich second mover is selected half 
of the time. Under intermediary selection, this fraction could be higher or lower, depending 
on the relative strength of fairness and opportunism motivations. In our experiment, selection 
by intermediaries is almost as distorted as random selection. The first movers select altogether 
16 poor second movers and 14 rich ones. This is statistically indistinguishable from the 
performance of random selection. 
5.4. Does random selection reduce embezzlement? 
As we have seen, random selection does not fare significantly worse in selecting the needy 
second movers than selection by intermediaries. The second aspect that defines the 
                                                 
24 There is an alternative explanation why poor second movers might complain less under random selection. 
When the intermediary selects, a poor second mover may (feeling entitled to be selected) have a higher 
aspiration level in IS than in RS (where the selection probability is known to be 50%). This aspirations 
perspective has the opposite implication (H2) for rich second movers – for instance, one of them explained a 
zero threshold in IS as follows: “I assume that the first mover would not choose…me…because I already have 
50 t[alers]. If he did, I would see it as a bonus so [I] would be satisfied.”  
25 Interestingly, two first movers chose the poor and made very low allocations to them. Their rationale was that 
the poor were “less likely to complain so as to get at least some money”, as one of them put it. Both of them did 
receive complaints.  
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performance of a selection scheme is the extent to which it induces self-diversions 
(embezzlement) by the intermediaries. In our experiment, this translates into the question of 
which design generates higher offers to the second movers. Table 3 shows the average offers 
made to second movers, computed separately for the two treatments and the two types of 
second mover. 
Table 3. Average allocation to selected second movers 
 IS RS Overall
Poor (S1, S2) 24.1 42.3 32.9 
Rich (S3, S4) 26.3 36.7 31.7 
Overall 25.1 39.5 32.3 
We observe strong evidence of increased allocations in RS. Fisher’s two-sample permutation 
test applied to the average offer made by each individual first mover rejects the null 
hypothesis that offers are independent of the treatment at a significance level of α = 0.001 
(one-sided).26  
Observation 4. Random selection induces higher offers than selection by intermediaries. 
The higher offers under random selection are consistent with the idea that first movers believe 
H2: expecting less gratitude and more complaints than in IS, they raise their offers in RS. 
Complaint thresholds were indeed higher on average in RS than in IS, so qualitatively their 
expectations were met (see above), albeit not by enough to warrant the large increase in first 
mover offers (as we show now). 
We compute the expected payoffs that each first mover would obtain when all role-consistent 
matchings with pairs of second movers from the set of 60 second movers, occur with equal 
probability.27 In RS, first movers obtain an average expected payoff of 94.5. In IS, expected 
payoffs are significantly lower with 80.4 (one-sided 1% level, Fisher’s two-sample 
randomisation test). The first movers pay for overestimating the gratitude effect: their low 
offers provoke too many complaints. Note also that both figures are below the sure payoff of 
100 that a first mover can get by offering 50 to each second mover he selects.28 This indicates 
                                                 
26 It is difficult to detect statistical significance for rich and poor recipients separately, because first movers 
frequently chose one of each kind. Therefore we have to split up the data according to the target beneficiaries 
(rich/rich, poor/poor, mixed) and this limits the number of data points: in RS, only three such first mover choices 
are available for the poor/poor and rich/rich cases. Nevertheless, we obtain significantly higher offers (in RS 
relative to IS) for both mixed and purely poor pairs of active second movers. 
27 These expected payoffs are more informative than the actual payoffs in the experiment, which are affected by 
luck in the (random) matching of first and second movers. We used simulations to compute these figures, 
pooling all thresholds from the same role (rich or poor). 
28 Only one first mover (in treatment IS) managed to get an expected payoff higher than 100 (first mover C in 
session 1 offered 25 each to S3 and S4, generating an expected payoff of 101.3). A first mover aiming to 
maximise expected payoff should always offer 35 to a rich second mover, and 50 to a poor (and in IS, should 
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that there is a tendency to underestimate the probability of a complaint (or, less plausibly, a 
high degree of risk-seeking behaviour). Possibly first movers estimate the likelihood of a 
single complaint and fail to adjust this to fully take into account the fact that a complaint from 
just one of the two second movers is sufficient for punishment.29 They therefore fail to 
exercise sufficient precaution given the severity of the punishment.30
5.5. Comparing the effectiveness of the two mechanisms 
A donor is particularly interested in the extent to which the funds are delivered to the needy. 
With a similar selection distortion and a clear reduction in embezzlement, random selection 
turns out to be the superior institution in achieving the donor’s goals. In our IS treatment, a 
poor second mover gets an expected allocation of 12.9 talers (weighing the average offer of 
24.1 with the 16 30  probability of being selected). When selection is random, this figure rises 
to 21.2. This is the principal advantage of random selection from the donor’s viewpoint. 
Furthermore, the rich villagers – who in the village context are still poor in absolute terms – 
can also expect to benefit from random selection. Their expected allocation rises from 12.3 in 
IS to 18.3 in RS. Thus both poor and rich villagers are better off when the intermediary’s 
selection power is removed. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
We have investigated the comparative performance of two approaches to an important 
instance of the donor problem. In the first approach, the donor delegates the two tasks of 
selecting beneficiaries and delivering their benefits, to the same person - the intermediary. In 
the second approach, the donor separates the two tasks, delegating delivery to the 
intermediary, but employing a separate actor (who we assume can only select beneficiaries at 
random) to carry out the selection task. 
Our data show that separating the selection task from the delivery task can significantly 
improve the donor’s ability to deliver benefits to the needy. In our data, the distortion caused 
by having an uninformed party select the beneficiaries is indistinguishable from that caused 
by opportunism when the intermediary has the power to select; opportunistic intermediaries 
select the non-needy to reduce the risk of complaints. It is in the delivery task that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
select both rich second movers). This strategy returns 107.7 in IS. In RS, this payoff is 105.3 when giving to two 
rich second movers, and 104.5 when giving to one rich and one poor. 
29 See Gneezy (1996) for evidence on anchoring and insufficient adjustment in probability estimations. Another 
possibility is that they only make a point estimate of the complaint threshold distribution and act as if giving this 
amount would avoid all complaints. 
30 There is no room for learning in one-shot settings, but even if communication, say, increased the coherence of 
players' beliefs, observations 1 and 2a suggest that this would not undo our results. 
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performance of the two approaches part company. Diversion (embezzlement) is significantly 
reduced when the intermediary is not involved in selection.31
The results are consistent with our expectation that villagers are less likely to complain when 
they feel grateful to the intermediary for selecting them32 (and that intermediaries know they 
can therefore abuse selection power to shirk on delivery). Our controlled experimental setting 
allowed us to identify the behavioural responses of all the key actors involved in the donor 
problem. The consistency of their individual behaviours with the mechanics of our motivating 
arguments makes us sufficiently confident in our results to justify the costs of investigating 
the effect of task separation in the field settings that confront real-world donors. 
The magnitudes of individual behavioural responses and the overall effect of our design 
adjustment (separating selection and delivery) are bound to depend heavily on context.33 So 
fieldwork is crucial. In-depth field studies could fruitfully investigate the many possible 
causes of gratitude. The task of gathering reliable data will be onerous, but our experimental 
results show that there may be significant benefits waiting to be discovered. Ideally, this 
investigation would use a randomised trial,34 along the lines of our experiment. Though it is 
inherently difficult to recreate a fully controlled environment of the type we have set up in the 
laboratory, and observability problems often impede the measurement of individual 
behaviour, careful experimentation may identify the success of different selection institutions 
in the field. Moreover, a natural experiment could emerge if, for instance, a number of donors 
changed their target selection policy. Controlling for bias with recent econometric techniques 
might then permit measuring the impact of delegating selection power to the intermediary. 
It is very difficult to gather survey data in a fully reliable manner, but our questionnaire did 
reveal the role of gratitude and fairness norms in creating the observed distortions. So a 
carefully designed field survey may help in identifying significant behavioural effects. If 
these effects fit the behavioural interactions driving our laboratory results, this would further 
suggest that it is worth paying the costs of a full-fledged randomised trial (and surveys would 
help solve any practical problems associated with changing the selection institution). 
                                                 
31 This is consistent with Olken’s (2006) empirical finding (see also Galasso and Ravallion (2005)) that 
involving local leaders in selection does not improve targeting. However, Olken (2006) does not account for and 
therefore measure whether local involvement in selection worsens the agency problem of delivery. 
32 Fairness concerns can explain some of our results, but reciprocity (e.g. from gratitude) is needed to explain 
this impact of the treatment on recipient complaints. 
33 Note that our experiment may under-estimate selection and delivery distortion: first, our anonymous setting 
allows intermediaries to distinguish rich from poor beneficiaries, but they could not observe individual 
characteristics affecting propensity to complain; second, bribery options would distort delivery towards the rich 
since the rich can better afford to bribe. 
34 Under this technique, beneficiary groups are randomly assigned to different treatments of a development 
project. This method has been increasingly used to evaluate programme effectiveness, in, e.g. health (Miguel and 
Kremer (2004)), education (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, and Kremer (2002), Banerjee, Cole, Duflo, and 
Linden (2005)) and sources of funding (Kremer and Gugerty (2006)). For a general discussion see Duflo and 
Kremer (2005). 
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Our results also suggest further experimental research into the donor problem. We focused on 
the one-shot interaction to capture scenarios where the donor organises a short-term project 
(such as disaster relief), or a project that only needs seed finance (as with the goats in our first 
example, whose population is self-sustaining through reproduction). However, it is also 
common for the donor to provide resources to a fixed village over an extended period of time. 
In these cases, additional sources of distorted selection may come into play. For instance, 
villagers may now refrain from complaining out of fear that the intermediary would never 
select them again – this reinforces our idea that separating selection from delivery may be 
optimal.35 Tackling these issues greatly complicates the framework because of the many 
additional design questions (e.g. variation in neediness over time, possible replacement of an 
intermediary caught embezzling or voting over alternative intermediaries). Nonetheless, we 
believe these dynamic effects present a promising avenue for future research. Our broader 
hope is that experimental research on the donor problem, by identifying the interaction 
between selection and delivery as we have done here, can contribute in the effort towards 
constructing better-designed projects. 
                                                 
35 Villagers may also fear that their complaints will lead the donor to direct its resources elsewhere, abandoning 
the “problem village”. Such fears are reported, e.g. in McIvor (2004). 
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Appendix A. The Data 
Table A1. Decisions and matchings in the IS treatment 









ation IS RS IS RS IS RS IS RS 
A S1 30 S2 30 0 0 0 30 25 10 50 50 
B S3 20 S4 20 25 25 20 20 0 35 20 30 
C S3 25 S4 25 50 40 40 20 0 20 10 10 
1 
D S1 20 S2 10 35 30 26 40 0 0 0 33 
A S1 30 S4 20 50 50 35 35 0 20 20 40 
B S1 50 S2 50 40 30 45 45 0 20 10 10 
C S1 20 S4 20 50 50 30 49 30 30 30 20 
D S1 20 S2 20 40 40 30 0 20 20 0 0 
2 
E S1 5 S2 5 50 50 40 40 33 33 20 20 
A S1 20 S2 15 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 20 
B S1 40 S3 10 50 30 25 35 0 50 0 0 
C S3 9 S4 9 40 50 20 10 10 10 40 20 
3 
D S3 45 S4 45 20 40 50 50 40 30 40 50 
A S3 45 S4 45 35 30 0 0 0 0 30 40 
7 
B S2 20 S3 30 30 25 0 10 0 0 30 30 
Table A2. Decisions and matchings in the RS treatment 









ation IS RS IS RS IS RS IS RS 
A S3 50 S4 50 30 0 50 0 50 50 0 0 
B S1 40 S3 40 35 25 50 50 15 15 20 20 
C S1 50 S2 50 10 15 35 40 50 50 0 0 
4 
D S1 35 S4 30 20 20 10 0 30 20 0 20 
A S1 50 S2 50 0 0 0 0 50 50 25 25 
B S3 40 S4 40 0 50 20 30 10 30 50 50 
C S2 30 S3 30 0 0 20 15 0 0 10 10 
5 
D S2 50 S4 50 40 50 30 30 0 20 20 0 
A S2 40 S3 30 0 0 35 30 0 0 0 30 
B S1 40 S3 10 20 40 20 10 24 22 25 20 6 
C S2 30 S4 30 45 37 0 0 20 30 20 30 
A S1 50 S4 50 35 30 50 50 25 25 35 35 
B S3 30 S4 30 33 25 39 34 0 0 25 35 
C S1 40 S2 40 50 50 0 0 35 35 0 0 
8 
D S2 40 S3 40 0 0 40 40 50 50 0 0 
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Appendix B: The Instructions for the Experiment 
General information  
We thank you for coming to the experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study how 
people make decisions in a particular situation. During the experiment you will earn money. 
How much money you earn will depend on your decision and on the decisions made by other 
participants. Payments are confidential, we will not inform any of the other participants of the 
amount you have earned. In the following, all amounts of money are denominated in talers, 
the experimental currency unit. 
The decision situation 
Each game is played between a group of five players. There are two types of players in each 
group: one first mover and four second movers, called S1, S2, S3, and S4. The first movers are 
located in one room, the second movers in a different room in this building. The game is 
divided into two stages. In the first stage the first mover makes a decision; in the second stage 
the second mover makes a decision. 
At the outset of the experiment, each player has an endowment. This is the sum of money you 




Second mover S1 
Second mover S2 
Second mover S3 








The first mover must decide how many talers s/he allocates to two of the second movers. 
These two are called the active second movers. How they are selected is described later. The 
total amount of money available is 100 talers. The first mover receives this money in addition 
to the endowment mentioned above. The first mover can divide these additional 100 talers 
among the two active second movers and him/herself in any way. These allocations are added 
to the players’ respective endowments. No money can be allocated to second movers who are 
not active. 
There are two different variants of the game. Half of the experimental groups play each 
variant. The variants differ in how the two active second movers are determined.  
Variant 1: The first mover determines the two active second movers.  
Variant 2: The two active second movers are predetermined by a random draw, where each 
second mover is equally likely to be selected. 
Note that only one of the variants is used in this session.  
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Stage 2: 
The second movers are located in a different room in the building. At the second stage, each 
second mover is informed about whether s/he is active, and if so, how much money the first 
mover has allocated to him/her. No second mover is informed about how much money has 
been allocated to other second movers, nor how much money the first mover has allocated to 
him/herself. 
If a second mover is active and has received an allocation of less than 50 talers, s/he can file a 
complaint. A complaint has the following consequences: First, the payoff of each second 
mover who files a complaint is reduced by 10 talers. Second, the first mover’s payoff is 
reduced to a final amount of 50 talers (in other words, s/he loses what s/he allocated to herself 
and his/her endowment is reduced from 100 to 50 talers).  
If no complaint is filed, the first mover’s final payoff is his/her endowment plus the amount 
s/he has allocated to him/herself. If any complaint is filed, the first mover’s final payoff is 50. 
A second mover’s final payoff is his/her endowment if s/he is not active. If active, then his/her 
final payoff is his/her endowment plus the amount the first mover has allocated to him/her 
minus the above-mentioned complaint costs if s/he files a complaint. 
How to make decisions 
The first movers and the second movers make their decisions by filling out a decision sheet.  
Each first mover is told whether s/he is in variant 1 or 2. If in variant 1, s/he selects exactly 
two second movers to be the active second movers. Then, in all variants, the first mover 
decides how to allocate the 100 talers among him/herself and the two active second movers. 
Though the game involves two stages, all players make their decisions simultaneously. The 
second movers decide about the amount below which they will file a complaint, if they are 
active and a lower amount than this is offered to them. Any number from 0 to 50 is feasible. 
After all decision sheets are collected, one first mover and one second mover of each type S1, 
S2, S3, S4 are randomly matched. A complaint is effective if the amount allocated to an active 
second mover is lower than the number this particular second mover has chosen.  
The second movers make decisions for both variants of the game, where the amounts below 
which they will file a complaint are specified separately for the three variants. Thus, all 
second movers specify one amount for the case that they have been selected as active by the 
first mover (variant 1), and one amount for the case that they have been selected randomly 
(variant 2). Note that both variants are equally likely to be played today. 
Note that you specify the amount below which you file a complaint. This means that a 0 in a 
particular variant means that you will never complain when active in that variant; a 50 means 
that you will complain unless given at least 50. 
After all decision sheets have been collected, one first mover and one second mover of each 
type S1, S2, S3, S4 are matched to form a group of five. The decisions are carried out using 
your decisions for the variant that is played in this session. A complaint is effective if the 
amount allocated to an active second mover is lower than the number this particular second 
mover has chosen for this variant.  
Payoffs 
At the end of the experiment, the talers are converted into pounds at a rate of 10p per taler. In 
addition, every participant receives £4 for showing up. 
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Appendix C: The Post-Experimental Questionnaires 
First Movers, IS Treatment 
We would like you to state your motives for taking the decisions as you did.  
(1) Please give your reasons for why you selected the two second movers that you chose. 
(2) Why did you choose the particular amounts you allocated to these second movers? 
First Movers, RS Treatment 
We would like you to state your motives for taking the decisions as you did.  
(1) Why did you choose the particular amounts you allocated to the active second movers? 
(2) If you chose to allocate the same amount to each of the second movers, why did you do 
so? If you chose different amounts, why did you do so? 
Second Movers 
We would like you to state your motives for taking the decisions as you did.  
(1) Why did you choose the amounts that you chose? 
(2) If you chose different amounts for each variant, why did you do so? If you chose the same 
amounts, why did you do so? 
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